UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT,

Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan

November 27, 2013

Debtor. 9:11 a.m.

HEARING RE. DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) AUTHORIZING THE DEBTOR TO ENTER INTO AND PERFORM UNDER CERTAIN TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS WITH THE PUBLIC LIGHTING AUTHORITY AND (II) GRANTING OTHER RELATED RELIEF (DOCKET 1341)

> BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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MR. HAMILTON: Good morning, your Honor. Again,
Robert Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the City of
Detroit. We filed our motion. You received the objections
in our -- received the reply from both the City of Detroit
and the State of Michigan. Just in brief, in general
background, because it's important to get the facts right
here because if we get the facts right, I think most of the
objections go away, approximately \$40 million a year in --

THE COURT: Excuse me one second, sir.

MR. HAMILTON: Sure.

THE COURT: All right. We need to pause for a minute to see if we can get CourtCall working. All right, sir, you may proceed.

MR. HAMILTON: Again, your Honor, for the benefit of those on the phone, Robert Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the City of Detroit. Again, with respect to the City of Detroit's motion to approve the public -- the PLA transaction, I wanted to briefly set forth the facts underlying the motion because those facts are important for resolving the objections that have been made to the motion. In brief, your Honor, the city -- the residents of the City of Detroit currently pay approximately \$40 million a year collectively in utility tax revenue. That tax is collected by public utilities and the resellers of those utilities.

There is no dispute by anybody in this courtroom or

anybody in the City of Detroit that the city's lighting system is in a complete state of disarray. The state legislature enacted Public Act 392 to address that issue. Public Act 392 allows for the creation of a Public Lighting Authority, and Public Act 100 requires the city -- if a Public Lighting Authority is created, it requires the city to pay up to \$12-1/2 million of the utility tax revenues that it collects to fund the Public Lighting Authority. pursuant to those Michigan state statutes. The City of Detroit established on February 5th of this year the Public Lighting Authority. On August 1st of this year, the City of Detroit entered into the original trust agreement that provides for the funding of the Public Lighting Authority. Since entering into the original trust agreement, all -pursuant to that trust agreement, all utility tax revenues, all 40 million bucks, on a monthly basis has been transferred to the trust with all amounts in excess than 12-1/2 million collected by the trust being sent back to the city. That's pursuant to Public Act 100 and pursuant to the trust agreement, and that is the current state of affairs. That is the status quo. And regardless of what this Court does with our motion, those are the facts that exist. All of the \$40 million in tax revenues is currently collected and deposited The trust then sends all amounts in excess of in the trust. one-twelfth of 12-1/2 million every month back to the city.

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The amended trust agreement and the construction and finance agreement, which we've called the PLA financing agreements in our motion, for which we seek this Court's approval, have no impact at all on the transfer of the \$12-1/2 million of utility tax revenues to the PLA and all the excess amounts back to the city. That already occurs whether or not this motion is approved or not. What the PLA financing agreements do and why we're asking the Court to approve them is they allow the city to pledge to the PLA and thereby allowing the PLA to pledge to the Michigan Finance Authority, the MFA, those \$12-1/2 million in utility tax revenues that the PLA currently receives from the City of Detroit pursuant to Public Act 100. By pledging those tax revenues that they already receive pursuant to Public Act 100 and the trust agreement, the PLA will then be in a position to enter into agreements with the MFA, and then buyers or banks would be buying bonds from the MFA to issue bonds that will enable the PLA to amass the capital to begin a substantial reinvestment in fixing the lighting system in the City of Detroit. Public Act 100 only allows the PLA to receive \$12-1/2 million every year out of the utility tax revenues regardless of how much is pledged by the City of Detroit pursuant to the construction and financing agreement that we're asking for approval of. All amounts beyond the 12-1/2 million that Public Act 100 requires to be funded to

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the PLA must be returned to the city regardless of whether or not they are pledged pursuant to the construction and financing agreement.

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We also -- the documents also include an operation and maintenance agreement that will cost the city similar amounts to those that the city would otherwise have expended itself if the city was responsible for maintaining and improving the portions of the public lighting system that the PLA improves if the city had to do that on its own. In essence, the operation and maintenance agreement does not cost the city more money. In fact, hopefully it'll save the city money.

The way the PLA governance -- the way the PLA is governed, the way it works and the lighting plan has worked is the PLA consists of a five-member board appointed by the city's chief executive and the City Council. That board, the PLA board, must include a licensed attorney, a licensed engineer, and a CPA or a financial expert under Sarbanes-Oxley. The PLA must work with the City Council on developing a comprehensive three-year lighting plan which the PLA must adopt every two years. That's pursuant to Public Act 392, Section 17. In fact, the City Council has approved the construction and finance agreement and the operation and maintenance agreement and the amended trust agreement that we're asking this Court to approve as well. The construction

and finance agreement obligates the Public Lighting Authority to improve, extend, and repair the public lighting system according to the lighting plan. It obligates the PLA to complete two pilot project areas by the end of this year subject to operational and funding considerations. Those two pilot project areas are two ZIP codes in the City of Detroit that are just small areas in the city where the PLA can commence the improvement, extension, and repair of the lighting system in those areas. That will serve as a model and a test for develop -- for improving the rest of the city's lighting systems. The construction and finance agreement authorizes the PLA to issue bonds as long as those bonds don't require payment in excess of \$12-1/2 million a year and the city agrees not to do anything that might impair the security the bondholders have in the \$12-1/2 million of utility tax revenues that are pledged pursuant to the C&F agreement. This construction and finance agreement cannot be terminated at will, and it expires only when all of the PLA's bond obligations are completed. The original trust agreement will be replaced by the amended and restated trust agreement. The primary purpose and the only material change in the trust agreement is to add the MFA as a party to the trust agreement. It is not currently a party to the original trust The reason you need to add the MFA is because the MFA is the one issuing the bonds to Citibank for which the

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proceeds are used to buy the bonds from the PLA under 392, and so MFA needs to be a party to the trust agreement in order to complete the pledging of the liens on the revenues pursuant -- to secure the payment of those bonds.

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The operation and maintenance agreement that we're asking the Court to approve obligates the PLA to operate and maintain the portions of the public lighting system that have been improved, extended, and repaired by the PLA pursuant to the lighting plan. It's essentially an outsourcing agreement. As the PLA completes its improvement, repair and construction in an area usually delimitated by a ZIP code, the PLA will take over the operations and maintenance of the system for that area. Thus, the amount of lights that the PLA operates and maintains under this agreement will increase over time until the construction is completed. The PLA has to keep the portion of the system that it is responsible for operations and it has to repair nonfunctioning lights within seven days of it being reported. The PLA can delegate its responsibilities and will likely do so to DTE Energy.

The city will reimburse the PLA for its costs associated with the operation and maintenance as well as paying an administrative fee of \$126,250 per month. The total annual reimbursement by the city to the PLA for the operation and maintenance of the lights that the PLA takes over is capped at \$8.024 million adjusted for inflation

except for any maintenance necessitated by third-party criminal acts, in which case the city has to foot the bill.

The city remains responsible for vegetation maintenance around the public lighting system, and the city remains responsible for costs associated with damage to the lighting system that results from criminal activity. So, in addition to the \$8 million cap on operation and maintenance, we have to pay for damage caused by vandals and mowing the grass.

The city will pay the reimbursement cost up front each quarter based on the number of streetlights that it is responsible for maintaining, for example, \$9.62 per overhead fed streetlight per month. At the end of each quarter, the PLA will determine the actual amount expended, and either the PLA will pay the city the difference if the city overpaid, or the city will pay the PLA if the city underpaid except that, again, in no event will the city go over its \$8.024 million cap. Either party can terminate the operation and maintenance agreement on one year's notice for convenience.

Based on those facts, we can review the substance of the objections that were filed by the objectors. In short, we have basically two arguments. One, we have provided all of the information that is necessary and sufficient for everybody to evaluate this transaction. We provided all of the relevant legal documents, including the lighting plan,

which is attached to the motion. The city's advisors met with Syncora's and other creditors' advisors on November 12th of this year to discuss the various city improvement projects, including the PLA's plan for the lighting system.

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Number two, and most important, the PLA tax revenues, the \$12-1/2 million a year that we're asking this Court to approve the pledging of, are not available currently to fund any creditor distributions under any plan of adjustment. That \$12-1/2 million already goes now to the trust whether this Court approves the motion or not, so no creditor in this case is adversely affected in any way by pledging these revenues since those revenues are not available to pay creditor -- or to contribute to creditor recoveries going forward. Because no creditor is adversely affected in any way by pledging these revenues to the trust or to the PLA, no creditor has any reason to file an objection to this motion. Notwithstanding that, we've already incurred substantial delay as a result of the objections that have been filed by Syncora and others. has already delayed the PLA's ability to close on an initial interim \$60 million of financing, which was going to be used to complete the initial project for two ZIP codes and start the public lighting improvement for the rest of the area of the City of Detroit, which was supposed to close earlier this month but has been delayed pending resolution of these

objections. That \$60 million of interim financing will then be replaced by the long-term financing in March of roughly \$210 million of 30-year bonds. We've already had to delay the \$60 million, quote, interim loan, bridge loan, in order to resolve these objections by parties that aren't affected adversely in any way by the relief that we're seeking. buyers of the bonds from the MFA, Citibank, who provide the proceeds to the MFA that the MFA will use to buy the bonds from the PLA, have requested that this Court approve the transaction and approve the pledging of the revenues pursuant to 364(c), and, therefore, we are asking this Court to approve it. This is a necessary step and an essential step and an urgent and important step to improve the lighting in the City of Detroit. There is absolutely no reason not to approve this motion because nobody is adversely affected in any way by the relief we're asking for, and on that basis we ask the Court to approve the motion.

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THE COURT: What's the standard -- the legal standard by which your motion is to be judged?

MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, as we tried to articulate in our reply brief, we do not believe that the normal Farmland standards that apply for 364(c) in a Chapter 11 case apply here because here we have the unique situation where the liens that we are trying to pledge are not liens on any property that can be used to pay for creditor recoveries.

And the <u>Farmland</u> factors generally apply when you're trying to encumber property that would otherwise be available for distribution to creditors. That is not the case here.

THE COURT: Right. I got all that --

MR. HAMILTON: Okay.

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THE COURT: -- from your papers, but what I didn't quite get was what is my role here --

MR. HAMILTON: It is just --

THE COURT: -- from your perspective?

MR. HAMILTON: It is just to confirm the business judgment of the City of Detroit that it is an appropriate exercise of its judgment to pledge the \$12-1/2 million each year that is already sent to the trust, to pledge it -- in addition to sending it to the trust, to pledge it so that that pledge can provide the security for issuing the bonds to Citibank by the MFA.

THE COURT: You asserted that the costs resulting from this transaction, if it's approved, of operations and maintenance is roughly equal to what the city pays now anyway?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HAMILTON: That is our expectation. It will not be affected by whether this Court approves or disapproves the motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Where do I find that in the record?

MR. HAMILTON: It follows from -- all the operations and maintenance agreement does is outsource or make the responsibility for performing those services and paying for them the responsibility of the PLA as opposed to the City of Detroit. Somebody has got to pay for it. If the PLA -- if we don't outsource it to the PLA, then the City of Detroit has to pay for it.

THE COURT: Right, but how do we know that they are roughly comparable?

MR. HAMILTON: Because the City of -- well, whether or not they're -- it certainly isn't going to cost the city more because we're certainly spending more than \$8 million a year now, the City of Detroit is. When we outsource it to the PLA, our expenses are capped at eight million plus fixing lights that are broken by vandals and mowing the grass, so any way you cut it, it's going to be less than we're spending now because of the \$8 million cap.

THE COURT: Where will the -- where will the PLA get the funds if those expenses exceed the amount that the city is obligated to pay?

MR. HAMILTON: From the financing that we're asking the Court to enable to happen by pledging the revenues from the bonds.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HOWELL: If I may, your Honor, Steven G. Howell, Dickinson Wright, special assistant attorney general, appearing on behalf of the State of Michigan. I will be brief, your Honor. The State of Michigan supports and concurs in the city's motion. Our reply focused on and my comments will be limited to the issue of the commitment of these revenues and that they are unavailable. The argument has been made that the city has proposed pledging utility tax revenues to finance construction and maintenance of the public lighting system, quote, "that could be used to fund recoveries to creditors," close quote. We believe this legal argument -- this argument is legally flawed, cannot be sustained because utility tax revenues may only be used for two public safety purposes. One is the funding of the construction and maintenance of the public lighting system, and two is to retain or hire police officers.

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The structure that creates this is PA 392, the
Public Lighting Authority Act, and PA 100, the City Utility
Users Tax. The Act PA 392, the Public Lighting Authority,
was intended to, quote, "create an equitable and reasonable
method and means of financing, operating and maintaining a
lighting system to supply lighting in sufficient quantities."
The structure is set up, as mentioned by Mr. Hamilton, such
that the PLA sells its bonds to the Michigan Finance
Authority, a state entity. The Michigan Finance Authority,

in turn, markets those and sells those providing the credit support necessary to create a more marketable bond at a lower cost. Utility tax revenues are then pledged to secure the payment of those bonds.

PA 100, the City Utility Users Tax, permits cities that form a lighting authority, as Detroit has, to then levy and collect a utility users tax from the utility customers. Revenues collected under PA 100 may only be used to service the Public Lighting Authority bonds or, if not otherwise pledged to pay the bonds, the revenues must be used to retain or hire police officers. As mentioned, the maximum amount that comes out of that is \$12-1/2 million annually.

In addition to putting that cap on, the Municipal Lighting Authority Act provides, and I quote, "The pledged revenues are exempt from being levied upon, taken, sequestered, or applied toward paying the debts and liabilities of the local government." Then it goes on to say other than the PLA-related costs. Since the utility tax revenues could never be used to pay the city's creditors, the city is not restricting, removing, or otherwise taking a revenue stream that could be used to fund creditor recoveries.

Your Honor, the most fundamental and important function of the city is to provide for the safety and welfare of its residents and visitors. While quibbling over roof

repairs at the Manoogian Mansion is one thing, equating that to addressing a public lighting system that has upwards of 45 percent of its lights not functioning in a city challenged by high crime rates is not the kind of discussion we should be having here this morning. The state and the city believe that the -- that addressing the public lighting deficiencies will aid in reducing the crime rate in the city. The creation of the statutory framework to facilitate an adequate public lighting system and providing the means to pay for it by directing revenues to that purpose is the essence of the exercise of the political and governmental powers of the state and city. This framework is one that we would ask this Court to respect, particularly in light of Sections 903 and 904, and to do so by granting the city's motion today. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. ARNAULT: Good morning, your Honor. Bill
Arnault on behalf of Syncora Guarantee and Syncora Capital
Assurance. I wanted to begin, your Honor, by just
acknowledging and stating on the record that the purpose of
our objection was not to -- we're not objecting to the fact
that the city is trying to improve its lighting system. We
recognize that the city has many challenges and that fixing
its lighting is one of them. However, what we're objecting
to and the purpose behind our objection is we take issue with

the process that the city has engaged in here and the means by which they put it in front of this Court. You heard today Mr. Hamilton make a number of representations. In their motion they set forth a number of representations, and in the proposed order they have a number of factual findings that they would like -- that they would like your Honor to make, and yet they have yet to provide any evidence that would support any of the representations today or any of the factual findings that they have set forth in the proposed order, and that's really our biggest concern is this lack of transparency and the fact that we really are at a loss as to what exactly is going on, how much it's going to cost the city, the type of process that it engaged in, the negotiations that occurred that resulted in these transaction documents. We have yet to see any of that information, so for the city to come in and, for example, ask the Court to enter a Section 364(e) finding of good faith and arm's length negotiations without providing evidence, we feel that that's a failure of process that we would like to see remedied, so what I'd like to discuss with your Honor this morning is the limited discovery that we think that we should be permitted to take in order to explore the representations that the city put forth today and that go directly towards the factual findings that are set forth in the proposed order, and I believe that this actually has two benefits. First of all,

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we're still very much in the dark as to what exactly is going on with this transaction.

THE COURT: If you'd like to withdraw that characterization I will permit you to, sir.

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MR. ARNAULT: No. I'm going to stand by that. We have yet to see the bond documents. We haven't received any discovery regarding --

THE COURT: We are still very much in the dark.

MR. ARNAULT: Well, we are still very much in the dark. The process that -- I mean the city came in and talked about that there was a session last week where they provided additional information. Well, that may be true. When we object and say that we don't have enough information, for them then to come in and provide some additional information, I don't think that's how the process should work. In addition, there's still a number of unanswered questions surrounding why they decided to enter into this transaction where -- the terms of the bond documents, why they decided to use the 12.5 all for debt service instead of for O&M purposes. There are just a number of unanswered questions out there that we believe discovery would shed light on. In addition --

THE COURT: Let's ask the more fundamental question. Why does Syncora even have a stake in the outcome of this?

MR. ARNAULT: Well, I know that this issue was

raised by the city this morning, and they're saying that this really has no impact on credit recovery, but what they're miss — the point that they're missing is that cash is fungible, so under PA 100, the cash could either go towards the PLA or it could go towards hiring and retaining police officers.

THE COURT: Syncora cares about that?

MR. ARNAULT: Well, yes, because the quality of life note is 110 or \$120 million will be directed towards hiring and retaining police officers, so if they're using money that they could otherwise be using to support the PLA --

THE COURT: Do you think I should judge for the city whether this money should go to lighting or police?

MR. ARNAULT: Well, that's essentially what they're asking you to do. They're asking you to approve this transaction, that it's in the best interest of the creditors. That's part of the factual findings that they're --

THE COURT: What does Section 904 say about that?

MR. ARNAULT: Well, Section 904 here says that if the city consents, which they explicitly do in the PLA motion, to the Court's review and approval of the transaction at issue -- and they've implicitly consented by asking your Honor to approve the transaction, say that it's in the best interest of the creditors, say that it's a sound exercise of business judgment, and the 364(e) finding, so they've

authorized your Honor to inquire into the uses, the needs, and how exactly they plan to spend this money and to structure the transaction itself.

THE COURT: Of course, the dark you're in doesn't compare to the dark that the citizens of Detroit suffer dayin and day-out and the crime that results from that. How much --

MR. ARNAULT: We don't dispute --

THE COURT: How much time are you talking about?

MR. ARNAULT: Just enough time to ensure that the --

THE COURT: How much time are you talking about?

MR. ARNAULT: Enough time for the city to provide --

THE COURT: I need a number.

MR. ARNAULT: Two weeks so that the city can provide adequate discovery, we can take depositions and have an evidentiary hearing on this.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. ARNAULT: We don't -- your Honor, we do not --

THE COURT: How many citizens will be victims of

20 crime in that two weeks?

MR. ARNAULT: Your Honor, we don't dispute that this is an important issue, but at the same time there is a process that the city has to go through in order to make sure that this is the best possible transaction. If the process is not vetted --

25 is not vetted --

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THE COURT: What's the singlemost significant factual question that you want answered from the city that you haven't gotten answered?

MR. ARNAULT: They haven't provided any information at all regarding the negotiation process, and they're asking for a 364(e) finding that it was conducted in good faith and at arm's length.

THE COURT: What specifically do you want to know about that? Is there something wrong? Is everything okay? I'm sorry. What specifically do you want to know about the negotiation process that you don't?

MR. ARNAULT: Well, we'd just like to know, for example, what were the terms that were exchanged back and forth, were there alternative proposals, is there a better proposal out there for the city and for its citizens that may actually be to the city's advantage to explore alternatives because while they may say that this is the best and only possible transaction, we're not sure, so if we wait 14 days or however long, then it may actually inure to the benefit of the citizens because we're coming up with a better structure.

THE COURT: I wonder if you'll ever be satisfied.

MR. ARNAULT: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: I wonder if you'll ever be satisfied.

MR. ARNAULT: Oh, no. We'll be satisfied with adequate discovery and just fully understanding what's going

on, so I'm happy to walk through the additional discovery that we think that we would --

THE COURT: Go for it.

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MR. ARNAULT: Okay. So, first of all, as I mentioned, we'd like to conduct discovery relating to the negotiations of the PLA transaction. Secondly, we'd like to conduct discovery relating to the alternatives that were considered by the city. We believe that this goes towards whether it was a sound exercise of business judgment and the requirements under Section 364(c). Third, we'd like to conduct discovery relating to the necessity of the proposed transaction, whether it was actually necessary to opt into the PLA to issue the bonds or whether, for example, they could have used the bridge loans or the proceeds from the bridge loan to get the process started, to conduct a survey which they're required to do under the C&F but we have yet to see, and there's no evidence that they've actually done that. So whether it's actually a better process to conduct a survey, get a better idea of the problem that they need to fix rather than going out and borrowing \$160 million straightaway.

We'd also like discovery into the intended uses of the proceeds. For example, we know that blight remediation is a big concern of the city, so we would like to ensure that when they're talking about the fixing the lighting issues, that they're also doing so and they're integrating it within their larger reinvestment initiatives and to make certain that some thought was given to that, so when their --

THE COURT: And you want me to judge that?

MR. ARNAULT: Well, they have asked you to judge that because they've asked you to --

THE COURT: I didn't quite hear that.

MR. ARNAULT: They have asked your Honor to judge whether the uses are in the best interest of the citizens.

THE COURT: What I heard was they want me to judge whether the financing arrangement is in the best interest of the city --

MR. ARNAULT: Well --

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THE COURT: -- not the uses to which the resulting financing will be put.

MR. ARNAULT: Well --

THE COURT: That makes me sound a little bit like a mayor and a City Council.

MR. ARNAULT: Well, I mean in some -- that's an interesting question, something that we've been thinking about, but it's this idea that need is inextricably tied to use, so it's difficult to consider whether a transaction is necessary without taking the next step and analyzing whether or how it's being used, so it's difficult to consider need within a vacuum. You can't consider whether you actually

need something --

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THE COURT: Well, but doesn't 904 answer that very question?

MR. ARNAULT: Not in this situation, your Honor. I would say --

THE COURT: I am not permitted to interfere with the city's political and governmental functions, am I?

MR. ARNAULT: No. Yes, you are, in the situation where the city has explicitly consented to it, I think, in paragraph 24 of their motion and they've asked you to issue findings of fact that go beyond and require you to inquire into exactly how the city --

THE COURT: Can you point to a specific finding that raises this issue, in your view?

MR. ARNAULT: Yeah. I'd be happy to, your Honor. For example, your Honor, I believe that they asked the Court --

THE COURT: Take your time. Pick a good one.

MR. ARNAULT: The authorization sought in the motion will benefit the debtor and its citizens and is a sound exercise of the business judgment. It's in the best interest of the debtor, its creditors, and other parties in interest, and is based on good, sufficient, and sound business purposes and justifications. I would read that rather broad factual finding to ask your Honor to inquire into how it's being used

because only then can your Honor determine whether or not it's in the best interest of the citizens and that it's based on the debtor's sound business judgment.

So moving along, we would -- in addition to the uses of the proceeds, there's also just a number of unanswered questions that we would like to depose, for example, Odis Jones, the executive director of the PLA, to understand why, for example, they did not use any of the 12.5 million to contribute to the O&M costs or what they expect the O&M costs to be. We know that it's capped at 8.5, but there's additional monies that the city will have to contribute, which will also come from the general fund, which could be used to enhance creditor recoveries, which could have an impact on creditor recoveries, which the city did not mention, so there are really a number of issues out there that we think that we still need to explore before we can adequately assess the merit of this transaction and whether -- before it's possible to enter the factual findings that the --

THE COURT: And all that in two weeks?

MR. ARNAULT: We've been moving at a brisk pace,

your Honor. We're happy to keep chugging away.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. ARNAULT: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. ANGELOV: Good morning, your Honor. Mark 1 2 Angelov for Ambac Assurance Corporation. We joined in Syncora's objection to the motion to approve the PLA 4 transaction, and I don't want to restate what's already been said on the record before the Court. What I would like to 5 highlight is one particularly egregious lack of transparency 6 in this proposed transaction, and that is that neither this 8 Court nor the creditors nor any interested party has any idea 9 what the exact terms would be of the bridge loan and the 10 long-term financing that the city is essentially asking this 11 Court to approve as being in good faith negotiated terms. 12 THE COURT: What terms don't you have, sir? 13 MR. ANGELOV: Well, we -- not included in the record on this motion -- and we certainly haven't seen it -- are any 14 15 of the documents relating to --16 THE COURT: What terms don't you have, sir? 17 MR. ANGELOV: The documents relating to the long --18 THE COURT: What terms don't you have? MR. ANGELOV: We don't have the --19 20 THE COURT: You said you don't have terms. 2.1 terms? 22 MR. ANGELOV: The interest rate, origination fees. 23 The city indicated that it was prepared to close on the 24 bridge loan, and presumably drops of documents were 25 available. Perhaps a term sheet has been agreed to.

not in the record in the motion as well. And, frankly, we're sympathetic to the need to proceed quickly with this process, but the city could have done more to meet its affirmative burden on this motion, we believe. They just haven't done so. There are some very specific factual findings that they seek in -- specifically in Section F of the proposed order.

THE COURT: So you need terms on the bridge loan and the final loan?

MR. ANGELOV: That's right, among other things. There's also lack of --

THE COURT: What other things?

MR. ANGELOV: There's lack of transparency as to the operating costs that are over and above the \$12-1/2 million that the city will be committing to the debt service on the long-term financing, and your Honor raised an excellent point that essentially while the city claims that the costs will be equivalent to what the city is spending now, there's simply no evidence in the record, and there are also two components -- significant components of the cost to the city over and above \$12-1/2 million that aren't subject to the cap. The vegetation removal fee or vegetation control fee we understand from some of the documents presented to City Council could be as high as \$2 million a year. And also not mentioned -- not included in the \$8 million cap is \$1-1/2 million a year in administrative fee that gets paid to the

PLA, so the record is simply not complete as to whether other alternatives have been explored, whether there are better alternatives, and that ties in directly into the finding that the city --

THE COURT: What other alternative might you suggest?

MR. ANGELOV: Well, simply -- I don't know that we have enough information at this point to suggest alternatives, but one possibility, for example, is whether or not the city really has to proceed with this transaction where PLA sells bonds to MFA, MFA then goes out and places them on the market. With the strong collateral that is being offered here, \$12-1/2 million in hard cash, it begs the question of whether or not this could not have been accomplished through a private deal, particularly because the city is seeking this Court's approval.

THE COURT: Hmm, I'm hearing an offer from your client there.

MR. ANGELOV: Again, we don't have enough information. If this is something that -- we don't know what the terms are.

THE COURT: No. No offer, huh?

MR. ANGELOV: I'm sure they'd be willing to entertain it on commercially reasonable terms.

25 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ANGELOV: Thank you, your Honor.

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MR. MARRIOTT: Good morning, your Honor. Vince
Marriott, Ballard Spahr, on behalf of EEPK and affiliates. I
rise really for two reasons, your Honor. One is to stand on
the firing line with Mr. Arnault and Syncora. I think
sometimes Syncora's positions tend to get delegitimized in
the sense that Syncora is viewed as a troublemaker in the
case and out on its own stirring the pot. I wanted to make
clear that on this and other matters it is not that it has
broad creditor support for the positions it's taken and that
many of the creditors in the case believe that it's raising
important and valid points that need to be taken into
account. Second, just on the 904 —

THE COURT: Well, then let me ask you. I searched in vain through all of your papers for any case law that suggests that in a Chapter 9 case the Court has the authority to engage in the kind of broad review of a loan transaction as you suggest --

MR. MARRIOTT: Well, let me --

THE COURT: -- you all suggest.

MR. MARRIOTT: Let me --

THE COURT: Do you have a case?

MR. MARRIOTT: Let me respond to that quickly and then get to what my sort of second point is because I want to respond, however hard it is, to your remark about what if a

person is killed at that dark street corner that would be lit but for this. Judge, I'm not aware that there is a whole lot of authority at all.

THE COURT: You're not aware what, sir?

MR. MARRIOTT: That there's a whole lot of authority at all with respect to the standards under which a municipality can get a DIP approved. I think that this case is unique in that respect, and you'll be making law on what the standards are.

I will respond to the 904 versus 364 argument in this way. I don't have an opinion on whether or not the city could have done this under 904 without coming to you at all. It may very well could have done this without coming to you at all, but I think that participants in the transaction wanted something from you. The city wanted certain findings, and other participants wanted to know that their liens were blessed. I don't think the city can have it both ways. I don't think the city can come in and say, "We want the sort of relief available under 364 and the sort of findings associated with relief granted under 364," and then say, "But you really have to enter those findings, and you really have to grant that relief because we could have -- we have 904 that limits your discretion in these areas." I don't think they can have it both ways.

But let me respond, I think, to the hard argument.

There's a larger principle at stake here.

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THE COURT: Well, but why isn't the reconciliation between 364(c) and 904 simply that the Court reviews the financial aspects of the transaction but not the uses to which the proceeds of the transaction will be put?

MR. MARRIOTT: Judge, I don't know how you make a judgment that it is prudent for the debtor to borrow money without at the same time making a judgment as to whether the use to which it's going to put that money is also prudent.

THE COURT: Well, but why do you assume --

MR. MARRIOTT: I don't know how --

THE COURT: Why do you assume that the first question is within the scope of 364?

MR. MARRIOTT: Well, because the Court has to make a determination about whether the debtor is properly exercising its business judgment in --

THE COURT: Do T?

MR. MARRIOTT: -- borrowing money and granting a lien.

THE COURT: Do I?

MR. MARRIOTT: I believe you do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why isn't the line -- okay. The city has decided to borrow money. The Court reviews the interest rate, other terms for reasonableness as it would in a Chapter 11 case.

MR. MARRIOTT: Right.

THE COURT: And to make sure that other creditors aren't prejudiced by those financial terms, but on the issue of whether to borrow the money and what to do with the money, that's political and governmental protected from this Court's review by 904. What's wrong with that?

MR. MARRIOTT: What's wrong with it, your Honor, is that I don't see how you can assess the reasonableness of the terms of the financing in a vacuum totally separated from the purposes of that financing. I don't know what interest rate makes sense in the context of a loan, the purpose of which hasn't been established. I mean a ten-percent interest rate might be fully justified by a loan for one purpose and wildly unjustified for a loan for another purpose. Repayment terms, same thing. I mean I think that what's reasonable in terms of financing terms is inexplicably intertwined.

THE COURT: Well, but we know what the purpose of this loan is.

MR. MARRIOTT: Well, we know what its purpose is. What we don't know is whether that -- the specific use to which the city will put the money is the highest and best use of the funds --

THE COURT: Well, but isn't that for the city -- MR. MARRIOTT: -- in this context at this time.

THE COURT: -- to determine?

MR. MARRIOTT: I think it would be for the city to determine if it were proceeding under 904 and not seeking involvement of this Court. I think the city has invited oversight by asking for findings and relief under 364. It's consented to oversight by seeking findings and relief from this Court under 364.

Can I ask your indulgence for a brief minute to talk about what I see the larger principle here?

THE COURT: Yes, absolutely.

MR. MARRIOTT: Thank you.

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THE COURT: I will lay off momentarily.

MR. MARRIOTT: Jump back in at any time. But I do think there's a larger principle at stake here, Judge, which I will acknowledge is illustrated more starkly by the DIP motion which is coming up but to which this motion --

THE COURT: Which motion we're not arguing today.

MR. MARRIOTT: Which argument we're not arguing today. Illustrated more starkly but not exclusively by the DIP motion to which this motion is relevant, I think, nobody disputes -- nobody disputes, as far as I know -- I don't -- the ultimate need to repair the city's streetlights, to remove blight, to improve public safety, and a thousand other things. That isn't the issue. What is at issue, I think, your Honor, is the context, timing, and methodology for all of these things. Detroit's problems are decades in the

making, and a genuine sustainable resolution of these problems will also take decades. Any course of action that is not premised on a comprehensive long view in crafting solutions will not succeed in producing such a genuine sustainable resolution, and this is in the papers but hasn't been really addressed yet. Development of a comprehensive long view solution, one that addresses both the present and future needs of the city while at the same time providing for the fair treatment of legacy creditors --

THE COURT: Is the bottom line of this argument that I should wait to do this until plan confirmation?

MR. MARRIOTT: It is our view that a piecemeal approach, which is the --

THE COURT: I'll take that as a yes.

MR. MARRIOTT: Well, yes, but I'm not sure yes fully does justice to my argument. It is, in fact, the argument that addressing the city's problems on a piecemeal haphazard basis that the city has done to date and not just with DIP's, with the swap counterparties, with Belle Isle, with the DIP --

THE COURT: So you want the people of the City of

Detroit to be in the dark not just for another two weeks but

until next summer or fall or winter, whenever we can get a

plan confirmed, if we ever do?

MR. MARRIOTT: Judge, I think it's better that the

solutions of the problems of the city be fixed on a permanent sustainable basis than that bandages be applied here and there which are not long-term solutions but which, in fact, at the end of the day could be antithetical to long-term solutions because it reduces or eliminates the city's flexibility in crafting a plan of adjustment that is workable for the city and acceptable to creditors, and it is our view --

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THE COURT: Tell that to the hundreds or thousands of people who are going to be victims of crime while we wait.

MR. MARRIOTT: Judge, again, you know, it's -- that is an argument that is almost unrespondable to because it can be made with respect to almost every problem the city has, and it can be used as a justification for fixing everything now, however ephemeral that fix might be and however antithetical it might be to a more comprehensive solution that will fix this stuff for good, won't have us back here again in five years, won't be the same sort of fix this little piece here, fix this little piece there that's been done by the city up to this point, which has not done a longterm solution, so, you know, I don't have a direct answer to if you don't do this, people will die; if you don't do that, people will die. Again, it's unanswerable, but what I do think is that it is in the best interest of the city to have a comprehensive long-term sustainable real resolution to its

problems. That's a plan of adjustment. And to the extent that the city takes piecemeal steps now that foreclose plan of adjustment options, that take this problem out of context and that problem out of context and either devalue or eliminate plan of adjustment options, it's a mistake, and it will not be in the long-term best interest of the city and that lighting and police and blight are best addressed together comprehensively and not piecemeal in which one solution makes another solution harder or impossible. That's the issue.

THE COURT: So that solution makes me mayor and City Council at the time of plan confirmation.

MR. MARRIOTT: Well, presumably or hopefully -- I mean more than hopefully -- I mean I think we all need to recognize that the only real way out of this is a consensual plan of adjustment that has been negotiated in such a way that if everybody isn't happy, they're at least willing to support the outcome, and the ability to reach a consensual outcome is made more difficult if the city's flexibility to construct terms and solutions has been cut off or hampered by quick fixes that in the aggregate won't survive because they're not part of a more comprehensive solution. That has been the practice to this point. This motion, although not necessarily for the reasons you've discussed -- the best example of it is, nevertheless, of a piece with it. These

issues will be raised more starkly and I will be up here again in a couple of weeks or whenever we have the hearing on the DIP motion to make the same points, but I don't think that any of these requests can be reviewed without an eye to the larger picture and whether or not it serves the larger picture or impedes it. Thank you. Thank you for letting me get that out. I have nothing further, your Honor, unless you have further for me.

THE COURT: No. Thank you, sir.

MR. MARRIOTT: Thank you.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Your Honor, for the Retiree

Committee, we actually have a suggestion on how the perceived prejudice that creditors might suffer from this transaction can actually be fixed without going through two weeks or six weeks or to confirmation. The city states unequivocally in its papers that there is an absolute rock-hard no more than \$12-1/2 million ceiling on how much money can be used from utility taxes for the purposes of installing new lights. We would ask your Honor to actually enforce that in order to avoid prejudice in two particular ways. Section 105 of the trust agreement, which is Docket Number 1341, has two provisions in it which we think --

THE COURT: I'm so glad you weren't about to say of the Bankruptcy Code.

MR. MONTGOMERY: No, your Honor. I was actually

definitely not going there.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MONTGOMERY: The first is that during 2013, the accumulation that is permitted in the trust fund is \$1,783,333 per month, which is a greater rate than a \$12-1/2 million annual computation. You may remember that counsel for the city said it's one-twelfth of the \$12-1/2 million, but in Section 105(a)(i), the annual rate of that number is 21.4, so we ask that your Honor specifically limit the accumulation in the trust fund to the 1.045 million per month, which would translate to 12-1/2.

The second thing that we would ask your Honor to do, again, to avoid prejudice on the part of creditors, is that to the extent that there is money in excess of the trust that -- of the funds that go to the retirement escrow fund, the Detroit retirement escrow fund, that that money go straight to the general fund and not go to the PLA fund.

Now, the reason we suggest that is that if it goes to the general fund, it will, in fact, be available for use in police and fire, and if it is, in fact, available for use in police and fire, that will have an impact on the budgetary issues that can benefit other creditors, including my clients, who have an interest in having the pension funds and the health and welfare benefits of the city funded.

Second thing in that regard we would ask your Honor

to do is to the extent that there is excess money in the Detroit retirement escrow fund, that it go straight to the general fund as well, so right now the way it's structured, excess of 12-1/2 goes first to the PLA. Excess of the PLA goes to general fund. We suggest that it go straight to the general fund. If your Honor were to impose that condition in order to avoid prejudice to creditors, in order to deal with this issue that we're locking up \$40 million instead of \$12-1/2 million, we think you can accomplish both goals -- that is, get the city going on its interim lighting solution, get the city going with respect to the mechanism for funding and borrowing, and at the same time give the creditors maximum flexibility on how the net effect of the extra \$38 million can actually be -- \$28 million can actually be used, and, your Honor, if you were to do that, that would resolve our objection that, as you know, we did join the Syncora objections, so thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else on the objecting side? For the city?

MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, I'd like to respond, but first I would like -- the counsel for the PLA would like to be heard on behalf of the motion.

MR. GREEN: Good morning, your Honor. Jonathan Green of Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone appearing on behalf of the Public Lighting Authority. I think this

transaction, frankly, is much clearer than parties make out. 1 2 I want to address it in two ways. First, I want to talk 3 about the financing. 4 THE COURT: I have to ask you to pause for a second. Doesn't your firm represent the city? 5 MR. GREEN: It does. 6 THE COURT: And the PLA? 8 MR. GREEN: We do for this transaction, and we have 9 consents. THE COURT: And that's not a conflict of interest? 10 11 MR. GREEN: We have consents, your Honor, and it's not a conflict of interest. 12 THE COURT: This is a waivable conflict of interest? 13 MR. GREEN: It's a waivable conflict of interest 14 15 under our rules, and we do have consents, and it should not 16 be a conflict, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Your firm is representing both sides of a transaction, and that's a waivable conflict of interest? 18 19 MR. GREEN: We're not representing both sides. 20 are not representing the City of Detroit with respect to this 2.1 transaction. 22 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 23 MR. GREEN: Thank you very much, your Honor. 24 THE CLERK: Please pull the microphone --

MR. GREEN: Of course. I want to talk about the

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financing first, the construction and financing agreement, and leave for a moment the O&M agreement. This transaction is the result of three pieces of legislation, Acts 392 --

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THE COURT: I have to ask you not to repeat what has already been stated on the record here.

MR. GREEN: Fair enough, your Honor, and let me put it this way. With respect to the financing transaction, there is not one way, not one instance in which one dollar of the \$12.5 million more or less goes to the city. The \$12.5 million under the statute a year goes to the PLA for purposes of financing this transaction, and that is true regardless of what the terms of the ultimate financing are. If the interest rate is higher, if the term is longer, it doesn't matter what the terms of the ultimate financing are because on a nonrecourse, non-full faith and credit basis, the City of Detroit pledges and does not have access to under any scenario, even if the financing isn't approved, one penny of the \$12.5 million. Every one of those dollars goes to the PLA or bonds issued to the PLA for the purposes of providing the city with public lighting. There's no discovery, frankly, that's relevant with respect to the transaction, and the reason -- that's true regardless of the terms. before and after default. It's true before and after acceleration. It's true after maturity because those three statutes read together work precisely that way. What happens

is on a monthly basis a monthly portion of the \$12.5 million goes to pay the bonds that are issued, and anything remaining up to 12.5 under the trust agreement goes to the PLA. Anything in excess on a monthly basis, on a monthly basis that that allocable portion immediately that month goes to the City of Detroit, so it doesn't matter what the terms of the -- if there's a default and the interest rate increases, your Honor, that means more of the monthly payment will go to pay interest rather than principal, but it doesn't come back to the city under those three statutes for any uses. fact, once the bonds have been retired, because that money will no longer be available or needed for the PLA, the income tax chargeable to the residents of Detroit comes down by approximately a corresponding amount, so, again, not one penny more, not one penny less, than twelve point million on an annual basis goes to fund the construction of the public lighting project for the City of Detroit. City of Detroit has no personal liability. The PLA has no recourse through the City of Detroit and its assets. There is no administrative claim that needs to be paid at any time. The City of Detroit -- it's a pledge created under these three statutes designed to enable a more efficient financing of the public lighting system for the City of Detroit, and you cannot envision a single situation in which one penny more or less than 12.5 million goes. For instance, addressing

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Mr. Montgomery's suggestion, the reason, first of all, it's a million seven and not a million four initially is because it wasn't for a full year. The statute has a \$12 million cap. Larger payments for the remainder of 2013 could be made. It's not multiplied by 12 because during that calendar year it won't reach anything like the 12.5. In year -- starting in 2014, the 12.5 million can be amortized over the 12 months. It's a lower payment, a million four. But any additional amount of money could not go from the PLA back to --

THE COURT: Million .04.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Yeah, a million .04; a million .041. And that equals the twelve five. This happens on a monthly basis. The money goes to pay the bonds. Any difference in the monthly pays -- goes to the PLA. It always adds up to 12.5 million, never a penny more, never a penny less, doesn't matter, doesn't matter at all what the terms of the subsequent financing are. City never has 12.5 -- never has less than 12.5, has no recourse liability, so taking discovery on that transaction is wholly and completely irrelevant because it can have no impact because it doesn't matter because it's of no concern, so that makes no sense. And, again, if you read 392 -- I won't belabor them -- 393 and 394, that's what it adds up to.

As far as the O&M and the maintenance agreement,

frankly, that is a 904(2) issue as well as the use of the proceeds. That O&M agreement never needed to be subjected to approval of this Court, and, in fact, if the City of Detroit were amenable, we would withdraw -- we have no objection -the Public Lighting Authority has no objection to the withdrawal of the operation and maintenance agreement from this Court's -- from the request for approval by this Court because that is a contract that could be entered into under 904(1) and (2). It goes -- it's a quintessential governmental service and a use of revenues to provide that lighting. So my suggestion, your Honor, is that no discovery is necessary because there isn't any scenario where that 12.5 changes in any way, shape, or form based on those three statutes and that subject to the agreement of the City of Detroit and your Honor's concurrence, we would withdraw or will have no objection to the withdrawal of the request that this Court approve the O&M agreement because the city under 904(1) and (2) is authorized to enter into it without this Court's blessing.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

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MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I want to hear from the city.

MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor. Robert

Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the city. The common flaw

of all of the arguments of the objectors is that, one, the

assertion that cash is fungible and somehow the relief we have requested will reduce cash otherwise available either directly or indirectly to their clients in a plan of adjustment. The same side of that coin worded a little different by Mr. Marriott was we shouldn't do now on a piecemeal basis steps that will foreclose options for payment of creditors in the plan of adjustment down the road. is the premise of all of their arguments. That premise is 100 percent false. It is false for two reasons. Even if we didn't -- hadn't yet created the PLA, if we hadn't even already created and implemented the original trust agreement and we were coming here and suggesting that we should do that and we needed your Court's approval to do that, the idea that setting up the financing this way would somehow reduce tax money otherwise available to the creditors when we get to the plan of adjustment stage is just wrong. As the State of Michigan set forth in their paper, in their reply, and in their presentation and as counsel for the PLA just articulated to some extent, the way it works is once you establish the PLA, 12-1/2 million bucks of your utility tax revenues have to go to fund the PLA. That's where it goes, and that's not reducing an option or a source of revenue available at the plan of adjustment stage.

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THE COURT: This is what Mr. Green just said.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, but let me finish. It's not

exactly what he just said. It's close. The reason it doesn't affect them is because if you don't fund the PLA, if you don't create it and fund it with the 12-1/2 million, then you have to -- because of Public Act 394, you have to reduce the city's income tax from 2.4 percent to two percent over the next four years, a .4 reduction -- .4-percent reduction in income tax over the next four years. If, on the other hand, you create the PLA and fund it with 12-1/2 million bucks, which is what we've done, then the city is exempt from the requirement of reducing the income tax from 2.4 to 2.0 over the next four years. They get to keep it at 2.4. And the statute requires that of that 2.4, .2 percent has to be redirected to the police budget to make up for the fact that you're taking 12-1/2 million out of the police budget to put it in the PLA, which means that the ultimate result is if you create a PLA and fund it, you end -- the City of Detroit ends up with .2 percent more in income tax revenue than it would otherwise have. We end up with 2.2 percent available to pay -- to provide city services and pay creditors, whereas if we don't do the PLA, all we have is a two-percent tax, so the bottom line is even if we hadn't already established the PLA, if we were coming here asking for your approval to do so, the result would be that by creating the PLA, we are increasing the revenue available to the city to pay creditors in addition to funding the PLA by .2 percent of an income tax.

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However, you don't even get there because in this instance, we've already created the PLA, so we're already obligated to fund the \$12-1/2 million every year. That's already going. So even if you don't approve this motion, that \$12-1/2 million will never be available to pay Mr. Marriott's clients at a plan of adjustment stage. This motion doesn't foreclose any option that is available to be considered in the plan of adjustment process because the 12-1/2 million bucks at issue is already gone. The only thing we're asking this Court to approve is our pledge about 12-1/2 million as security for repayment of the bonds, but that 12-1/2 million bucks is already gone and not available to creditors.

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THE COURT: Right. If that's all you're asking the Court to do, what's with the finding of fact that was read to me that you want me to approve?

MR. HAMILTON: The finding of fact that was read to you was not verbatim. The finding of fact is that the pledging of the tax revenues is done in good faith under 364(e). We are not asking you to approve the borrowing. The borrowing is not done by the City of Detroit. The borrowing is done by the PLA, which is not within this Court's review. What's within this Court's review is the city's pledge of the tax revenues, but there is no borrowing by the city for this Court to put thumbs up or thumbs down on. The borrowing is by the PLA.

THE COURT: Is the order you want me to enter attached to your motion?

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MR. HAMILTON: I believe it is, yes.

THE COURT: There haven't been any changes in it in the meantime?

MR. HAMILTON: Not that I'm aware of, your Honor.

THE COURT: What do you think of Mr. Green's suggestion?

MR. HAMILTON: The problem with Mr. Green's suggestion -- well, the first problem -- the first one counsel for PLA pointed out. The reason that it doesn't come out to 1.04 right now is we're making up for the entire year of 2013 in less than 12 months. The second part of the suggestion ignores the reality that the original trust agreement, the current state of affairs already requires all of the tax revenues, all 40 million, to go to the trust and then the excess over 12-1/2 to come back to us. already the current state of affairs. The MFA and Citibank, the buyer of the proposed bonds by the MFA, have already structured their transaction on the assumption that doesn't change, so we can't close on a transaction that will result in bonds being sold eventually by the MFA to Citibank if you change -- if you force us to change a trust agreement so that only some of the revenues go to the trust instead of all 40 million with the excess coming back to us.

THE COURT: Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my question. Mr. Green suggested that the city withdraw its request for approval of the -- I think it's the operating and maintenance contract.

MR. HAMILTON: I got confused on counsel, your Honor. I thought you were talking about counsel for the Retiree Committee.

THE COURT: Montgomery. No.

MR. HAMILTON: You're talking Mr. Green for --

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. HAMILTON: -- the PLA.

THE COURT: He's the one on your side.

MR. HAMILTON: The city is --

THE COURT: He's on your side.

MR. HAMILTON: Yes. Got it. My mistake, your Honor. I'm still trying to get the scorecard straight on this. The city is amendable to withdrawing the operation and maintenance agreement from the request for the Court's approval. No one was requiring us to do that. We thought in order to try and fulfill everybody's demands for full transparency that it was wiser to include the O&M agreement in the body of documents, but technically we don't need the Court's approval of that agreement. All we need is the Court's approval of our pledging of the revenues so the bonds can be issued.

Other than that, I have -- the only other thing I would say, your Honor, with Mr. Arnault's original arguments about you can't make factual findings without facts, I believe he's incorrect because, one, none of the material facts are disputed; two, all of the material facts follow from the laws of the State of Michigan and the contract documents that we've attached to our motion, none of which are disputed, and the third thing I would point out is, consistent with what Mr. Green said, none of the parties here have an economic stake in this whatsoever, so they have no right to insist on discovery, litigation, and a full evidentiary trial in which they have no standing in which to argue. The amount of money --

THE COURT: They're concerned about the future of the City of Detroit.

MR. HAMILTON: Everybody is concerned about the future of Detroit, but in terms of what they're asking for, they're asking for discovery and an evidentiary hearing on issues that they have no right to raise and this Court doesn't have the ability to review about whether the PLA's deal with the MFA and Citibank is reasonable or not. You don't have the ability to review that because that's borrowing by the PLA, not by the City of Detroit. What you have the -- what you have the -- what are not available to

them in any way at all anyway. Why should the City of
Detroit and its residents incur the expense and more
importantly the delay for discovery and a full-blown
evidentiary hearing on something that doesn't affect them by
one penny in any way, and nobody has answered that question
because there is no answer.

THE COURT: All right. There was one more person that wanted to speak, which I will allow for two minutes, and then I'm going to take the matter under advisement.

MR. ANGELOV: Your Honor, Mark Angelov for Ambac Assurance Corporation. Frankly, the view that the city and the PLA have of this transaction is somewhat simplistic. Yes, it is true that \$12-1/2 million is committed to fund the operation of PLA. However, not all of that money must be dedicated to debt service. The statute caps the debt service permissible at \$12-1/2 million, but it also contemplates that administrative expenses and even power can be paid for using that \$12-1/2 million. And so to say that there is no way that this -- the resolution of this motion will affect monies that are available to the creditors is simply -- it's simplistic.

And as far as the proposed order goes, I would like to read to your Honor the language that -- of the factual finding that the city wants this Court to make. The PLA transaction documents --

THE COURT: I've got it here. What page are you on? 1 2 This is Section E --MR. ANGELOV: 3 THE COURT: E? Okay. 4 MR. ANGELOV: -- of the proposed order. 5 THE COURT: Hold on. Okay. Go ahead. MR. ANGELOV: The PLA transaction documents are the 6 7 result of good faith arm's length negotiations among the 8 debtor, the PLA, the MFA, and the initial purchasers of the 9 MFA bonds. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever 10 concerning those negotiations. 11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 12 MR. ANGELOV: Thank you, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Green, I've got to call you back to 14 the lectern. 15 MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I have to ask you in all candor how I 17 can find good faith arm's length negotiations when your firm represents both parties to this transaction, albeit not on 18 19 the transaction but on a continuing ongoing basis in this 20 case. 2.1 MR. GREEN: Okay. Well, let me --22 THE COURT: How can I find that that's good faith 23 arm's length? 24 MR. GREEN: Let me address, first of all, what the 25 good faith standard is and then apply it to the question you

asked.

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THE COURT: Good faith arm's length.

MR. GREEN: I was going to -- yes. Collier's -- I'm looking at Collier's. It's Volume 3, and I'm going to read because it's -- I think it is instructive. In 364 -paragraph 364.061, and let me -- yeah -- at 364-32, "The courts disagree as to whether the trial court may make an express finding of good faith. Some courts so hold while other courts hold that good faith may be presumed, although the presumption may be overcome by evidence in the record below. Lack of good faith includes" -- this is what we're talking about when we talk about good faith for 364(e) purposes. "Lack of good faith includes knowledge of the illegality of the transaction, an action taken for an improper purpose such as to gain some advantage in litigation or otherwise, or a failure to reveal material facts to the Court. Bad faith has also been found where it is evident from the loan agreement itself that the transaction has an intended effect that is improper under the Bankruptcy Code," and they cite EDC Holding for that.

The type of bad faith they are talk -- good faith that is applicable in $364\,(\mathrm{e})$ is good faith on those kinds of terms. This is a financing --

THE COURT: I accept all of that, but --

MR. GREEN: Okay.

THE COURT: -- your order or the city's order here 1 2 says the results of good faith arm's length negotiations. How can I find arm's length negotiations when your firm is on 3 both sides of --5 MR. GREEN: Your Honor, with all --THE COURT: -- this transaction? 6 7 MR. GREEN: With all due respect, my firm was not on both sides of this transaction. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. I'll accept that as a factual matter, but the truth remains that your 10 firm represents both sides of this transaction in this case. 11 12 MR. GREEN: We are not representing both sides of this transaction in this case. We are not --1.3 14 THE COURT: Your firm represents the City of 15 Detroit. Not --16 MR. GREEN: 17 THE COURT: Your firm represents the PLA. 18 MR. GREEN: Not --THE COURT: Both in this case. 19 20 MR. GREEN: We are not representing the City of 2.1 Detroit in this case with respect to this transaction. 22 THE COURT: But you are on both sides -- you do represent both parties in this case. 23 24 MR. GREEN: In this case but not with respect to 25 this matter.

THE COURT: So I ask again how can I find arm's length negotiations in that circumstance?

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MR. GREEN: I'm representing to the Court that I represented -- we represented the PLA in arm's length negotiations with -- your Honor, look, there isn't -- if the question is merely by virtue of the relationship you described, it could not be in good faith, and I'm not going to be able to convince you otherwise. I'm here to tell you -- and if it was a factual inquiry to that effect, I would tell you the same thing -- I represented the Public Lighting Authority in this transaction even though we represent the City of Detroit in this case. And when I look at the standards of good faith negotiations and I look at the discussion about presumptions of good faith negotiations and I look at it in the context of a transaction that has not one bit of impact, not one bit of impact on this transaction -this is a statute, your Honor. In fact, we wouldn't even need to be before your Honor on the financing piece arguably but for the fact --

THE COURT: Are you going to ask the city to withdraw that, too?

MR. GREEN: No, I'm not going to ask the city to withdraw that.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take this under advisement, and I will give you a decision in 20 minutes, so

that'll be 10:55, please.

MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor.

3 THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Does someone have a written version of the order I can borrow? All right. Just hand that to my staff, and we'll be in recess.

(Recess at 10:32 a.m. until 11:15 a.m.)

THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated. Recalling Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.

THE COURT: One second, please. Everyone is here. Rule 1.7 of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct states in Part (a), "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes" that -- or "reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents after consultation," close quote. Under this rule, in these circumstances, client consent is not by itself enough.

In the circumstances, therefore, the Court is going to suspend its consideration of this motion and give the city and the Public Lighting Authority and any other interested party a brief opportunity to brief this issue or these two issues.

Issue number one, whether this rule 1.7(a) of the

Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, requires the Court to disqualify Miller Canfield from its representation of the Public Lighting Authority in this city, the consequence, of course, which would be the denial of this motion and the necessity of the city to start over with its negotiations with the PLA represented by an attorney who doesn't have a conflict of interest.

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Issue number two, how can the Court -- assuming we get past issue number one, how can the Court find good faith arm's length negotiations as the city requests the Court to find in these circumstances even if we assume and find that the conflict was properly waivable under Rule 7 -- excuse me -- 1.7(a)?

In the alternative, of course, the city is free to withdraw this motion.

Finally, I'll comment that it was most unfortunate that this issue came to the Court's attention in the way that it did because it is going to result in unnecessary delay. The Court will allow briefs on this matter until a week from today, so that's Wednesday, the 5th. Wednesday, the 4th. Thank you. Wednesday, December 4th. And we'll move on to the next matter. Oh, at that point, the matter will be under advisement, and I'll just issue a written order. There will be no further oral arguments.

(Proceedings concluded at 11:19 a.m.)

INDEX

WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

November 30, 2013

Lois Garrett